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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ERWIN MOTZKUS and LUCILLE
MOTZKUS, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
MARVIN CARROLL and ELVA
DWEEN CARROLL, his wife, and
MRS. RUTH KEMPTON,
Defendants and Appellants,

Case No.
8706

and
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, Trustee for Carl M.
Hansen,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ZION'S SAVINGS BANK &
TRUST COMPANY, TRUSTEE FOR CARL M. HANSEN

STATEMENT
How did Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company (trustee for Carl M. Hansen) get into this boundary line suit
between the plaintiffs, Motzkus, and the defendants Car-
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roll? It was thus : the Motzkus complaint was in two causes
of action (R. 9) :
1. One against defendants Carroll (alone) for

trespass upon the "Southerly 4 feet" of
property plaintiffs Motzkus are buying on
contract from the Bank-trustee, and for
actual and exemplary damages against the
Carrolls (claimed at $1200.00 and $2000.00) . The Bank was not-could not be-a
party to that cause of action for trespass
by defendants Carroll.
2. An additional (third) cause of action1
against the Carrolls in which the Banktrustee (as seller to plaintiffs Motzkus)
was also joined as defendant. 2 Here plaintiffs Motzkus charged the defendants Carroll and Kempton made adverse claims to
said 4 feet and prayed a determination of
its ownership and demanded that if ownership of the 4 feet were not held to be in the
Bank-trustee (as seller for the benefit of
the plaintiffs Motzkus, the purchasers)
they be awarded damages for loss of "business" and loss of "property" (set at $1200.00 and $4000.00) along with survey costs
and attorneys' fees.
Obviously, if the disputed property were adjudged to
be owned by the Bank-trustee (seller), the Motzkus damage
claims against the Bank would fail. That is exactly what
happened.
1

Cause of action No. 2 was stricken (R. 9).

Ruth Kempton (Carrolls' seller) was also made defendant in the 3rd
cause of action.
2
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Ownership of the disputed strip revolved about a purported old fence which defendants Carroll asserted established a boundary by "acquiescence" between property on
the North (being sold by the Bank to Motzkus) and property on the South (being sold by defendant Kempton to
Carrolls). That claim, if valid, would have taken from the
South boundary of the Motzkus property the 4 feet claimed,
shrinking its frontage from 115.54 feet to 111.54 feet along
State Street (on the East side between 33rd and 39th
South) and would have awarded a bonus accordingly to
Carrolls (on the South) expanding their State Street frontage to 61.77 feet from 57.77 feet actually called for in their
contract, as agreed between them and their seller (Kempton). (Exhibit P-2, Motzkus Purchase Contract, July 17,
1953. Exhibit D-24, Carroll Purchase Contract, July 1,
1955.) 3
But the trial judge on all the evidence adduced found
the ownership of both tracts to be exactly as set forth and
described in the respective purchase contracts, and that
the boundaries (Motzkus' South line and Carrolls' North
line) "coincided" (R. 168). That meant there was no shortage in the land being sold to plaintiffs Motzkus by the Banktrustee and, of course, that the plaintiffs had not been damaged. So the court gave them nothing against the Bank,
and dismissed. 4
3Reference to the 4 feet is taken from the complaint. No evidence ever
showed where the purported fence, if any, was actually located and
the trial court accordingly found "the exact location of said purported
fence line has not been determined or established herein" (R. 167).
4

The court awarded plaintiffs no damages against the Carrolls either.
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4
Carrolls and Kempton (their seller) appeal from the
judgment adjudicating the boundary in accordance with
the contract descriptions. They claim a boundary by acquiescence was established by the evidence.

RES
Til1

Plaintiffs Motzkus have not appealed from the dismissal of their damage claims against the Bank-trustee.

501
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
RESPONDENT BANK-TRUSTEE CONCURS IN
THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MOTZI(US.

POINT II.
THE LOCATION OF THE PURPORTED
FENCE LINE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, AS
THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED.

POINT III.
CARROLLS' CONTRACT TO PURCHASE DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE PURPORTED 4-FOOT
STRIP IN CONTROVERSY.

POINT IV.
MRS. KEMPTON, IN EFFECT, "DISCLAIMED",
AS THE COURT FOUND.
POINT V.
THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES ARE WITHIN
AN OFFICIAL PLAT AND SURVEY BY
WHICH THE TRUE BOUNDARY COULD BE
LOCATED. NO UNCERTAINTY COULD EXIST REGARDING THE BOUNDARY.
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POINT VI.
THIS COURT CANNOT CHANGE THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT AS TO THE BOUNDARY
ON THE EAST 194 FEET OF THE MOTZKUS
TRACT IN ANY EVENT.

POINT VII.
PLAINTIFFS MOTZKUS HAVE NOT APPEALED FROM THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE BANK-TRUSTEE. THAT
DISMISSAL IS, THEREFORE, FINAL AND
MUST STAND.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT BANK-TRUSTEE CONCURS IN
THE BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MOTZKUS.

.lJ.

Respondents Motzkus have ably presented the side
of the case upholding the trial judge's decision that no
boundary by acquiescence was established. The Bank-trustee concurs in that brief.

~~
DAM.

lHAI
AND
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POINT II.
THE LOCATION OF THE PURPORTED
FENCE LINE WAS NOT ESTABLISHED, AS
THE COURT PROPERLY DECIDED.
"The burden of proof upon an issue as to a
boundary is upon the party having the affirmative
of that issue." 8 Am. Jur., Boundarie,s §90.
"Likewise, one who claims acquiescence in a line
as the boundary between his property and that of an
adjoining owner has the burden of proving it." 11
C. J. S., Boundaries §104, P. 698.
See also Nelson vs. DaRouch (Utah) 50 P. 2d
273.
The trial court found that defendants Carroll asserted
an interest in a "portion" of the Motzkus property lying
South of an old fence line-

"* * * but that the exact location of said
purported fence line has not been determined or established herein" (R. 167).
That was all the trial court could find from the evidence
in this case. No witness said exactly where the purported
fence had been. No survey was ever made to locate its purported line. Here, for example, is a sample of the testimony
on which Carrolls-who had the burden of proof-relied
to establish a fence-line boundary by acquiescence and their
ownership of the strip of land up to that fence line:

"Q.

erties?
"A.

"VERL STATEN (R. 83).
Is there a fence between those two propYes, sir."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
"AMBER PATTERSON (R. 90).
Is there a fence between those properties?
There was when I left there (a year ago)."

"Q.

"A.

"MILDRED LEE FLANAGAN (R. 99).
Was there a :fence on the North of the

"Q.

property?
"A. There was a fence from State Street back
to Second East."
"LAWRENCE J. COX (R. 106).
"Q. Is there a fence between the Carroll property and the Motzkus property?

"A.

There was."

When pressed on cross examination about the location
of the supposed fence line, Cox could not give it at all (R.
113):
"Q. You don't know, is that your testimony?
"A. No."
"CECELIA L. SPRINGMAN (R. 114).
"Q. Is there a fence between the Carroll and
Motzkus properties?
"A. There was, yes."

"RUTH J. KEMPTON (R. 121).
"Q. Was there a fence between the property
that you lived upon and the property that Mr. Hansen lived upon and owned?
"A. Yes."
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That was defendants' case for a fence-line boundary by
"acquiescence". Nowhere did any witness fix the exact
location of the purported fence. Defendants had the burden.
They had to prove in that regard (1) that there was an old
fence line, and, (2) where it was. Whether an old fence line
was proved or not, they failed to "determine or establish
the exact location of its purported line". 5
It will not do to say it may have been about so many
feet from such-and-such a place. We were dealing with
valuable property and property rights. The court was being
asked to deviate from long established deed and survey lines
and take property from one owner and hand it over to another-up to a purported fence line. And, to do so, the
burden was on defendants to show where that line was
located, so that the court could definitely describe--by legal
description-the exact line up to which he would take property from one owner and award it to another-if he should.

Defendants had the burden. Surveyors were used abundantly, as the record shows. But none were called to run
the location of that purported fence line. It may have been 4
feet from the survey line here ; 1 foot there; 1 inch somewhere else ; on the survey line at another point; it might
even have crossed over and angled off across Carrolls' property along its tortuous course. Who knows?
The location of the purported fence line was never established by any evidence. The court properly found so
5Quoting from the court's finding (R. 167).
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and dismissed. The language in Glenn vs. Whitney (Utah)
209 P. 2d 257, 258 is appropriate:
"The mere fact that a fence happens to be put
up * * * for a long period of time will not
establish it as a true boundary."
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POINT III.
CARROLLS' CONTRACT TO PURCHASE DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE PURPORTED 4-FOOT
STRIP IN CONTROVERSY.
Here are the two properties :
495.8

ft

7'

'II

Description starts hereZ1on' s Sa v1ngs Bank-Motzkus tract

#

:

- -

0

~ ...,

- - - - - Pui;>!;rted i:r;o~6e8a~a)o~ bo~d;ry- - - - - 301.8 ft

...,

~

~
~

194 ft

~

~

Kempton-Carro 11 tract

~

Description starts here- ~
101

8

f't

~~~

Sketch is schematic only
Not drawn to scale
Not proportional by dimensions

i

Korth

The sketch shows the purported 4-foot controversywithin the broken line. It also shows the two properties as
they are described in the two purchase contracts: (1) in
the Motzkus contract with the Bank-trustee, and, (2) in
the Carroll contract with Mrs. Kempton.
Both properties front on State Street. The South-toNorth calls along State Street in the descriptions in the two
contracts are :
Motzkus Contract-115.54 feet.
(Ex. P-2.)
Carroll Contract-57.77 feet.
(Ex. D-24.)
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All Carrolls are purchasing then is 57.77 front feet.
That is all Mrs. Kempton agreed to sell. That is all Carrolls
agreed to buy. That is all Carrolls are entitled to. No more.
Yet, Carrolls contend they should get 4 feet more-61.77
feet.
On a contract to buy 57.77 feet, Carrolls claim
they should get 61.77 feet.
But that was not their contract. It was a 57.77-foot
contract; not a 61.77-foot one. But Carrolls want the court
to make it a 61.77-foot contract. However, courts cannot
make a new contract for the parties :
''Courts cannot make for the parties better
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied
to make." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts §228.
Thus, the court cannot make a 61.77-foot contract for
Carrolls who were "satisfied" to make a 57.77-foot one.
And:
"The court is not at liberty, either to disregard
words used by the parties, descriptive of the subject
matter or of any material incident, or to insert words
which the parties have not made use of." 12 Am.
Jur., Contracts §228.
Thus, the court may not disregard the words 57.77 feet
used by the parties as "descriptive of the subject matter" or
insert the words 61.77 feet "which the parties have not
made use of". Yet that would be exactly the result if the
trial court's proper judgment were not upheld.
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"Neither a court of law nor a court of equity
can interpolate in a contract what the contract does
not contain." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, §228.
So Carrolls cannot claim a purported extra 4 feet. Mrs.
Kempton had a legal right to contract to sell them what
she would-1 foot, 10 feet, etc., etc. She chose to agree to
sell them 57.77 feet only; and Carrolls agreed to buy that
limited frontage.
The result: assume for argument (without our admitting) that the purported extra 4 feet frontage had actually
inured to the Kempton property through a supposed change
in boundary by "acquiescence" (which we say was never
proved), making the Kempton frontage 61.77 feet, and we
' have this:
1. Mrs. Kempton contracted to sell only a part
of her tract to Carrolls-57.77 feet.
2. Mrs. Kempton did not contract to sell the
remaining part of the supposed tract to
Carrolls--4 feet-but retained it herself;
and the court cannot re-write or expand the
Carroll contract to include for Carrolls the
supposed 4 extra feet.
But Mrs. Kempton does not claim the supposed extra
4-foot tract along the supposed fence line. She has never
claimed the same, as shown by her conversation with Motzkus (in March, 1954), when the survey markers were
pointed out to her (R. 30) :
"A. We were just talking in a friendly sort of
manner and the topic of the survey was brought up
at the time. We showed her where our marker was
and there was no objections." (Motzkus' testimony.)
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While Mrs. Kempton was in court and testified, she did
not deny that conversation or claim she objected to the survey as pointed out to her by Motzkus. In fact, she explained
that she made no claim to the fence line or the fence and
did not care when Motzkus tore down the fence (R. 123):
"A. Well, no. He tore it down, but then I told
him it did not belong to me so I didn't care."
Mrs. Kempton does not claim the supposed extra footage. Carrolls' purchase contract does not include it. And
the trial court properly adjudged the boundary between the
two properties was along the survey and contract line.
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POINT IV.
MRS. KEMPTON, IN EFFECT, "DISCLAIMED",
AS THE COURT FOUND.
It is not contended that Mrs. Kempton ever disclaimed
by writing. The finding is (R. 168) :

"8. That defendant Ruth Kempton in August,
1953 knew of the survey boundary line and disclaimed interest in and to the property lying North
of said boundary line in that in June, 1955, said
defendant Ruth Kempton told the plaintiffs to remove a small fence running Easterly and Westerly
near the South boundary of plaintiffs' land in the
Western portion of plaintiff's property, stating that
said fence was not on her ground."
The disclaimer mentioned in the finding was not intended to mean a formal written one, but a disclaimer by
word or action only. The finding must be considered in its
entire context; then it is apparent that the disclaimer therein talked about was simply one where Mrs. Kempton told
Motzkus she did not claim the fence or fence line. That is
made plain when we consider the next finding (No.9) that
Motzkus, subsequent to and in reliance on that "disclaimer"
constructed the South unit of his motel where he did (R.
169).
The court's finding of Mrs. Kempton's disclaimer was
correct.
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POINT V.
THE ADJOINING PROPERTIES ARE WITHIN
AN OFFICIAL PLAT AND SURVEY BY
WHICH THE TRUE BOUNDARY COULD BE
LOCATED. NO UNCERTAINTY COULD EXIST REGARDING THE BOUNDARY.
A boundary by acquiescence arises only where there is
uncertainty over the true boundary location. That is the law
in Utah. This Court so ruled again as late as 1955. Jensen
vs. Bartlett (Utah) 286 P. 2d 804. Mr. Justice Wade pointed
out in the Jensen case that where the true boundary is
known, although parties agree that it shall be at another
place and erect a fence to mark it and acquiesce therein
"for a long period of time", such acquiescence will not establish a different boundary because-

"* * * the establishment of such a boundary line would have the effect of tran~ferring real
property by parol agreement contrary to our statute." 286 P. 2d 804, 805.
The opinion continued :
"Here the court found that there is no official
or original plat or survey by which the boundary line
can be located, and the evidence shows that the different surveyors do not agree on the location of the
boundary line." 286 P. 2d 804, 806.
And so the Court finally said :
"This clearly creates sufficient uncertainty on
which to base a finding of a boundary line by acquiescence."
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But, in our case, there was and is an "official or original plat or survey by which the boundary line can be located":
Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey. See
Exhibit P-11. Abstract of Title (Title Page, Map
therein, etc.) .
From that official plat or survey, the true boundary
could easily be located at all times. Both lots lie within Lot
7, Block 17, of said Plat, as the abstract of title shows.
(Exhibit P-11). The description of each tract is tied to
Lot 7 of said Official Plat:
The Zion's Saving Bank-Motzkus tract is tied
to the 1Vortheast corner of said lot 7 (cornrnencing
at a point South oo 06' West 114.76 feet and South
89° 53' West 200 feet from the Northeast corner
of Lot 7). (Exhibit P-2, Motzkus Purchase Contract).
The Kempton-Carroll tract is tied to the Southeast corner of the 1Vorth Half of Lot 7 ( cornrnencing
at a point which is North 0° 06' East 114.76 feet
and South 89° 53' West 394 feet from the Southeast
corner of the North Half of Lot 7). (Exhibit D-24,
Carroll Purchase Contract) .
Each tract (and the true boundary line between them)
could at all times be ascertained from the official plat or
survey. Jensen vs. Bartlett, supra.
Furthermore, the two "different surveyors" agreed
upon the survey line. Mack Kesler surveyed it for Motzkus
in August, 1953; again in July, 1955 (R. 70, 72). Bush &
Gudgell also meanwhile surveyed. Each surveyor put a
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"plug" in the sidewalk at the boundary line. And the two
plugs agreed perfectly:
Yours and Gudgell's came right together.
"A. Yes. I have the records there, and in
chaining the line, as we did, we agreed perfectly,
and we put in the plugs, and they agreed perfectly,
as close as you can get two plugs (R. 154) ."
"Q.

Thus, no uncertainty existed or could exist over the
true boundary line in this case because ( 1) there was an
"official plat or survey by which the boundary line could
be located" at all times, and, (2) the "different surveyors"
agreed, perfectly, on the boundary. Without such uncertainty, no boundary by acquiescence could result. Jensen vs.
Bartlett, supra.
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POINT VI.
THIS COURT CANNOT CHANGE THE TRIAL
COURT'S JUDGMENT AS TO THE BOUNDARY
ON THE EAST 194 FEET OF THE MOTZKUS
TRACT IN ANY EVENT.
The Carroll-Kempton property does not adjoin the
Zion's Savings Bank-Motzkus tract along the latter's East
194 feet. The two adjoin only along the West 301.8 feet of
the Zion's Savings Bank-Motzkus tract. That is clear from
the exhibits.
Exhibit D-15 (Large sketch).
Exhibit P-17 (MackS. Kesler survey map).
See sketch herein, page 12.
The owner of the tract adjoining the Zion's Savings
Bank-Motzkus property on the South, along the East 194
feet thereof (whoever he may be) was not a party to the
action and is not before the court. A boundary along that
portion could not be adjudicated in his absence.
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POINT VII.
PLAINTIFFS MOTZKUS HAVE NOT APPEALED FROM THE JUDGMENT DISMISSING THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE BANK-TRUSTEE. THAT
DISMISSAL IS, THEREFORE, FINAL AND
MUST STAND.
At the outset, we pointed out that one of plaintiffs
Motzkus' causes of action (3rd) was directed against the
Bank-trustee, demanding damages ( $1200.00 and $4000.00)
for loss of "business" and loss of "property", etc., if the
Motzkus property were found short by the purported 4 feet
involved. (See P. 2.) Judgment was against the plaintiffs in favor of the Bank-trustee (R. 173) :
"6. That plaintiffs' complaint and each and
every cause of action thereof be and is hereby dismissed as against defendant Zion's Savings Bank &
Trust Company, trustee for Carl M. Hansen, and
said defendant have judgment against plaintiffs, no
cause of action."
No appeal was taken by plaintiffs from that judgment
of dismissal against them. Only the Carrolls and Mrs.
Kempton (co-defendants of the Bank-trustee) appealed.
Their appeal was from only a portion of the judgmentthat part which held the true boundary prevailed over the
assumed fence-line boundary by "acquiescence". (Notice
of Appeal, R. 178.)
Plaintiffs Motzkus had the right to appeal from the
dismissal of their damage claim against the Bank-trustee.
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There can be no doubt of that. But they did not. That dismissal is now a final judgment against them--since it has
not been appealed.
"If less than all of several coparties appeal from
a severable judgment in which the interests of the
parties are independent, the appellate court may
reverse only the part of the judgment pertaining to
appellants." 5 C. J. S., Appeal & Error, §1920.
In Rosenthyne vs. Matthews-McCulloch Co. (Utah)
168 P. 957, plaintiff sued to cancel a deed. The trial court's
judgment did two things:
( 1) A warded plaintiff judgment cancelling the
deed, but,
(2) Awarded defendant judgment for money
against the plaintiff.
Plaintiff only appealed; and only from part (2) above
(the portion of the judgment awarding money against her).
Part (1) was not appealed (the deed-cancellation portion
of the judgment). This court (1) reversed the money judgment portion appealed from, but (2) found itself powerless
to interfere with the deed-cancellation portion because no
appeal had been taken (by defendant) from that part. It
said:
"In this jurisdiction it has repeatedly been held
that, in case a judgment is divisible, either party
who feels himself aggrieved may appeal from the
whole or any part thereof. To that effect is the
statute (Comp. Laws, 1907, §3305), which in part
provides:
"'An appeal is taken by filing with the
clerk of the court in which the judgment or
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order appealed from is entered a notice stating
the appeal from the same, or some specific part
thereo/.'6
"The plaintiff complied with the statute by
specifically stating in the notice of appeal that she
appealed only from that part of the judgment which
was in favor of the company and against her. The
company was thus notified that the plaintiff did not
bring up the whole judgment for review, and if the
company desired to have any other part of the judgment reviewed, it should have brought it up to this
court by cross-appeal." Rosenthyne vs. MatthewsMcCulloch Co., supra.
Here, as in the Rosenthyne case, by the Carroll-Kempton Notice of Appeal" (Plaintiffs Motzkus) were thus notified that
(defendants Carroll and Kempton) did not bring
up the whole judgment (the dismissal in favor of
the Bank-trustee and against plaintiffs Motzkus)
for review."
And, to paraphrase the Rosenthyne opinion:
"If the (plaintiffs Motzkus) desired to have any
other part of the judgment reversed (they) should
have brought it up to this court by appeal."

But they did
in favor of the
which dismissed
trustee, and that

not. They did not appeal from the portion
Bank-trustee against plaintiffs Motzkus
their damage claims against the Bankdismissal is now a final judgment.

6
The Rule now states the Notice of Appeal "shall designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from". U. R. C. P. 73(b).
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While, as we contend, the judgment was correct in all
its portions and must, therefore, be affirmed, still, if the
court should now reverse, it can reverse only the portion
within the single appeal of defendants Carroll and Kempton,
namely, the portion upholding the survey and contract line
as the true boundary over the claimed fence-line boundary
by "acquiescence". That is all that was appealed from.
Only Carroll and Kempton appealed. The court cannot
reverse the portion dismissing plaintiffs Motzkus' damage
claims apainst the Bank-trustee-for plaintiffs Motzkus
have not appealed from that. The judgment of dismissal
is now final.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company,
trustee for Carl M. Hansen, submits:
1. The side of the case upholding the trial judge's decision that no boundary by acquiescence was established has
been ably presented by Respondents Motzkus. The Banktrustee concurs in their brief.

2. The location of the purported fence line was not
established, as the court properly decided.
3. Carrolls' contract to purchase does not include the
purported 4-foot strip in controversy. That contract called
for 57.77 feet only. That is all Mrs. Kempton agreed to sell;
all Carrolls agreed to buy, and all they are entitled to. The
court cannot make a new 61.77-foot contract for Carrolls.
And Mrs. Kempton does not claim the purported extra 4
feet. She "disclaimed" any interest in it, as the court found.
4. The two properties are within an official plat or
survey-Lot 7, Block 17, Ten Acre Plat "A", Big Field
Survey-as shown by the abstract of title (Exhibit P-11).
Therefore, the true boundary between them could easily be
located at all times and no uncertainty could exist. Jensen
vs. Bartlett, supra. Without uncertainty, a boundary by
acquiescence cannot be established or prevail over a true
boundary line.
5. The court cannot change the trial court's judgment
as to the boundary on the East 194 feet, in any event. The
Kempton-Carroll tract does not adjoin the Zion's Savings
Bank-Motzkus tract along that portion. The owner of that
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tract (whoever he may be) is not before the court and a
boundary line along that portion could not be adjudicated
in his absence before the court. (See sketch, P. 12.)
6. Plaintiffs Motzkus have not appealed from the
judgment dismissing their cause of action for damages
against the Bank-trustee. That dismissal is, therefore, final
and must stand. Even were this court to reverse (on this
appeal taken by defendants Carroll and Kempton alone)
the judgment of dismissal (between the Bank-trustee and
plaintiffs Motzkus) must stand, for the plaintiffs have
not appealed therefrom and that judgment is final.
The judgment of the trial court is correct and must be
affirmed, with costs to the Respondent Bank-trustee against
appellants Carroll and Kempton.
Respectfully submitted,
December, 1957.
THOMAS & ARMSTRONG,
H. P. Thomas,
Frank Armstrong,
Edward M. Garrett,
Attorneys for above Respondent.
511 Walker Bank Building,
Salt Lake City 11, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

